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Policies to foster innovation are widespread, as without innovation an economy would
stagnate, with obvious negative eﬀects on the welfare of future generations. Financial
development is particularly important against the background of ﬁnancing constraints for
young innovative ﬁrms with few tangible assets (see e.g. Audretsch and Thurik [2001],
Rajan and Zingales [2001]); the venture capital industry in particular plays a crucial role
in the ﬁnancing of these ﬁrms (see Kortum and Lerner [2000]). Thus it is not surprising
that a broad range of public policy programs aims at fostering innovation by supporting
the venture capital industry. The European Investment Fund’s venture capital portfolio,
for example, amounts to more than 2.5 billion euros invested in more than 185 venture
capital funds. Thus the EIF has indirectly supported more than 1800 high-tech ﬁrms in
Europe (see EIB [2004]).
But the crucial question is – provided that governments should intervene in the venture
capital industry – how public policy programs should be optimally designed. This paper
evaluates diﬀerent public policy measures in order to ﬁll the gap in research on public
policy in the venture capital area – a particularly crucial gap, given the importance of the
venture capital industry and the high intensity of public support. To be more precise, the
present paper will study in detail if and how the optimal contract design between the ven-
ture capitalists and their portfolio ﬁrms is inﬂuenced by public intervention, whether this
modiﬁcation has any impact on the incentives and thus on the behavior of the contracting
parties, and ﬁnally, it will evaluate its impact on the market outcome as a whole.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to analyze public policy measures
by focussing on their impact on contract design. We think, however, that, due to the
prevailing role of explicit contracts in the venture capital industry, public policy measures
1can only be evaluated correctly when taking this impact into account. Explicit contracts
play such a predominant role because they are necessary for the solution of the severe
moral hazard and adverse selection problems resulting from the speciﬁc characteristics of
this industry, namely the active involvement of venture capitalists in the operations of the
start-up ﬁrms and the high degree of uncertainty to which venture capitalists are exposed
regarding the value of their investments, exacerbated by the small collateral platform
from which entrepreneurs operate. Moreover, as the partnership between entrepreneur
and venture capitalist is of limited duration (the venture capitalist’s objective is to exit,
i.e. to make a return by getting out), it is not possible to solve these conﬂicts of interest
implicitly. In fact, empirical studies conﬁrm the existence of complex and highly sensitive
contracts which not only determine the cash-ﬂow rights of the contracting parties but
also the speciﬁc control and decision rights of the venture capitalist (e.g. Kaplan and
Strömberg [2003]).
In order to allow for public intervention, we address potential ineﬃciencies in the
innovation process. We model the mentioned double-sided adverse selection and double-
sided moral hazard problems and, additionally, introduce a spill-over eﬀect on the rest of
the economy which is related to the realization of innovative projects. Thus within our
framework, the market solution will never be eﬃcient: while the contracting parties may be
able to solve the asymmetric information problems, they will never take the spill-over eﬀect
into account. But this spill-over eﬀect can be motivated by both empirical insights and
theoretical foundations. We take the OECD [2001] study as a starting point: “Although
venture capital does not aim at supporting R&D per se, its substantial emphasis on small,
high-technology businesses has enabled markets to become considerably more capable of
sustaining large, risky investments in R&D in early business stages (...) The inﬂux of
venture capital does not necessarily remove the rationale for government support for SMEs
2because signiﬁcant discrepancies can still exist between private and social returns to R&D
and innovation, even in sectors that receive considerable private capital. Recent research
indicates that the most successful government-funded small-business projects have been in
industry sectors that boast high levels of private venture capital. This ﬁnding suggests that
private venture capital signals the presence of signiﬁcant technological ﬁndings in a ﬁeld,
and that government funding can stimulate additional exploitation of those opportunities.”
Indeed, the existence of the described spill-over eﬀect is supported by empirical as well
as theoretical evidence: Griliches [1992] shows that highly innovative projects – such as
those ﬁnanced by venture capital – involve a spill-over eﬀect on the rest of the economy.
Their social rate of return can be twice as high as their corresponding private rate of
return. And the literature on endogenous growth distinguishes three eﬀects of R&D: the
positive eﬀect of innovations on the proﬁtability of other ﬁrms as shown by Romer [1986],
the so-called consumer-surplus eﬀect, and the business-stealing eﬀect – the extraction of
rents of one ﬁrm by another – as modelled by Aghion and Howitt [1992]. If the ﬁrst two
eﬀects are suﬃciently high – as it normally is for highly innovative projects – the spill-over
eﬀect on the rest of the economy will be positive.
Finally, in order to evaluate the existing public policy measures in the venture capital
industry we have identiﬁed their main mechanisms and accordingly constructed ﬁve styl-
ized program categories for analysis: ex post grants, guarantee programs, ex ante grants,
investment grants and public support. Ex post grants can be interpreted as tax breaks and
there is a great variety of programs which can be classiﬁed as ex ante grants. The awards
of the “Small Business Innovation Research Program” or those of the “Advanced Technol-
ogy Program” in the United States are among the most prominent examples. Guarantees
have also been an important ingredient of programs in many countries: in Germany, for
example, risk transfer was an essential component of many programs of KfW until 2004
3and a guarantee program targeted at investments in later stage ﬁrms still exists; in the
Netherlands, the “Private Participation Guarantee Order Scheme” was in operation be-
tween 1981 and 1995; the Banque du Développement des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises
in France and the Austria Wirtschaftsservice Gesellschaft both give speciﬁc guarantees.
Direct supply of capital by the government in order to increase the investment of the
venture capitalists (we classify this form in the investment grants category) is organized
in diﬀerent ways, as can be observed in various current and former programs of KfW in
Germany, of the European Investment Fund, or of the “Small Business Investment Com-
panies Program” in the United States. Finally, public support is not very common but the
European Investment Fund, for example, has the “Seed Capital Action Program” whereby
part of the VC’s management costs are covered. We will show that within our framework
only ex post grants can implement the ﬁrst-best situation independently of speciﬁcation
issues. The success of guarantee programs, ex ante grants and some types of investment
grants, on the contrary, depends strongly on project characteristics as well as speciﬁcation
issues: sometimes they not only fail to provide further incentives to the contracting parties
but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
Our paper is related to two strains of literature: ﬁrst, the papers which deal with
public policy in the venture capital area and second, the broad literature on optimal
contract design between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (see Tykvova [2000] for an
overview). As regards the ﬁrst strain of literature, only very few important papers exist.
In an empirical study, Lerner [1999] examines the “Small Business Innovation Research
Program” in the United States and ﬁnds that ﬁrms which had received awards were
more likely to attract venture capital ﬁnance. In a second article, Lerner [2002] reviews
the rationale for public policy programs and comments on their design. Da Rin et al.
[2004] examine how public policy can contribute to increasing the share of venture capital
4investments in innovative companies, ﬁnding that the availability of exit channels plays
an important role and that a reduction of the capital gains tax as well as a reduction of
labor regulation yield such an increase. The only theoretical contributions to deal with
public policy in a venture capital framework with a moral hazard problem are, to our
knowledge, the papers by Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (see, for example,
Keuschnigg [2003], Keuschnigg and Nielsen [2003] or Keuschnigg and Nielsen [2004]).
They analyze public policy strategies in an equilibrium model but do not model contract
design in detail. Thus, as mentioned, our paper is the ﬁrst to model explicitly the impact
of public intervention on contract design.
Therefore, the present study is also related to the broad literature on optimal contract
design where we can distinguish two types of papers: those which determine the optimal
contract design in a double-sided moral hazard framework and those which analyze the
optimal contract design in an adverse selection framework. We think that it is important
to combine these two types to do justice to the complexity of reality and so we construct
our basic approach in two steps: ﬁrst, we determine the optimal contract design in a
double-sided moral hazard framework; then, in a second step, we introduce a double-
sided adverse selection problem. More importantly, this procedure allows us to represent
diﬀerent development stages of the venture capital industry. Our approach is thereby based
on the models of Schmidt [2003] and Houben [2002] which provide a good starting point
for our analysis as they show that both problems can be solved by adequately designed
contracts. Moreover, the mechanisms of these contracts are empirically well supported
(see Kaplan and Strömberg [2003]). We modify these models so as to address the public
policy issues in a tractable manner.
Other theoretical papers on optimal contract design which are close to the framework
of the present paper are Casamatta [2003], Repullo and Suarez [2004] and D’Souza [2001].
5Casamatta [2003] determines the optimal security design in a double-sided moral hazard
framework too, but she shows that convertible securities are only optimal with high in-
vestments and that the ﬁrst-best outcome is not reached. Repullo and Suarez [2004], on
the other hand, focus on how a double-sided moral hazard problem in the expansion stage
inﬂuences the security choice at the beginning of the relationship between entrepreneur
and venture capitalist. They show that only when no objective performance indicators
pertain after the start-up phase does the initial claim of the venture capitalist correspond
to a combination of standard non-linear claims which may be interpreted as convert-
ible security. D’Souza [2001], in contrast, shows the optimality of convertible securities
in a framework within which only the venture capitalist has to expend eﬀort and the
entrepreneur gets private information about the state of the project after contracting.
This paper proceeds as follows: after presenting our framework which is based on
the models of Schmidt [2003] concerning inexperienced and Houben [2002] concerning
experienced venture capital markets, we will ﬁrst focus on inexperienced markets in section
3 analyzing the market outcome without intervention and determining the impact of the
diﬀerent public policy categories afterwards. In a second step, in section 4, we will study
how maturation of the market changes the impact of the public policy measures derived.
Section 5 summarizes our results. The sixth section makes some robustness checks. Section
seven draws together the threads.
2 The Model
We consider a market of many venture capitalists (VCs) looking for proﬁtable investment
opportunities and some entrepreneurs (Es) with innovative ideas but without ﬁnancial
resources. Therefore, each E has to convince a VC to invest an amount of I in his project.
6As the market of VCs is competitive, Es have all the bargaining power ex ante. Moreover,
we assume that the VCs and the Es are risk-neutral.
Projects diﬀer only in their inherent innovative value α which is always observable
by the contracting parties. Each project can be in three possible states (bad, medium,
good) which result from a combination of the market conditions for the innovation and
the quality of the E’s idea. The market conditions indicate whether the sales expectancy
for the product is good or bad and the quality of the idea refers to the technological
quality, i.e. the degree of feasibility. The project is of high quality with probability p or
of low quality with probability (1 − p); and the market conditions for the innovation are
either good with probability q or bad with probability (1 − q).
If the market conditions are bad and the quality is low, each project will fail and yield
a liquidation value of l(a). The liquidation value depends on the eﬀort exerted by the
VC in order to sell oﬀ the assets of the company and l(a) is increasing and concave in a.
Moreover, we assume that the ﬁrst-best liquidation value l(a∗
b) is smaller than the initial
investment I.
If the market conditions are bad and the quality is high, or if the market conditions
are good but the quality is low – we refer to these cases as the medium state of the project
– the project is a so-called “living-dead”. This means that while the project may leave a
return in the amount of the initial investment I it will never generate a higher cash ﬂow
– even if both parties exerted high eﬀort levels.
If the market conditions are good and the quality of the idea is high, the project is
in the good state and yields a gross surplus of ¯ x, which depends on three factors: the
inherent innovative value of the project (α), the eﬀort spent by the VC (a) and the eﬀort
exerted by the E (e). We interpret the eﬀort of the E as eﬀort invested in the technological
development of the project and that of the VC as involving managerial contributions. We
7assume that eﬀorts are imperfect substitutes in the good state: if at least one contracting
party does not exert any eﬀort, the cash ﬂow amounts only to the initial investment I
irrespective of the inherent innovative value:
¯ x(0,a,α)=¯ x(e,0,α)=¯ x(0,0,α)=I (1)
Otherwise, the cash ﬂow function is increasing and concave in both eﬀort levels and in the
inherent innovative value. Eﬀort levels are not complementary at the margin and their
marginal impact does not depend on the innovative value α of the project. This is stated
formally in the following assumptions.
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
> 0 and
∂2¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a2 < 0
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
> 0 and
∂2¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e2 < 0
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂α
> 0 and
∂2¯ x(e,a,α)
∂α2 < 0 (2)
∂2¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a∂e
=0
∂2¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a∂α
=0 and
∂2¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e∂α
=0
Thus to sum up, the cash-ﬂows generated by the project V are deﬁned as
V (e,a,α,θ)=¯ x(e,a,α) for θ = good
= I for θ = medium (3)
= l(a) for θ = bad
Furthermore, we assume that the eﬀort of the E and the VC, which is observable but not
veriﬁable, occasions costs to the amount of:
c(e)=
1
2
βe
2
c(a)=
1
2
γa
2 (4)
8In addition, the project yields non-transferable private beneﬁts B to the E if and only if
he has the control rights over the company in at least one period1.
Finally, we assume that a project in the good state, whose cash ﬂow exceeds the
initial investment costs, induces a spill-over eﬀect on the rest of the economy which is
more pronounced for more innovative projects and the eﬀort choices exert an inﬂuence on
it. The spill-over eﬀect is thus given by
S(e,a,α)=εV (e,a,α) for V (e,a,α) >I
=0 otherwise (5)
The time structure of the model is as follows:

t =0 t =0 ,5 t =1 t =1 ,5 t =2 t =3 t =4 t =5
Government
announces
public policy
program
(announcement
is binding)
[Signals]
λ and η]∗∗
Take-it-or-
leave-it-oﬀer
of contract(s)
by E;
Investment
o fIb yV C
[E and VC
learn the
state of the
project]∗
Choice of
eﬀort level e
by E
Choice of
eﬀort level a
by VC
Cash-ﬂow
is realized
Execution
of the
contract
Figure 1: Model Timeline
* = inexperienced markets ** = experienced markets
At t0, the government announces its public policy measure. This announcement is costless
but binding. The time of execution of the public policy measure depends on the type of
measure. At t1, the E makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the VC. If the VC accepts, I is
invested. At t2, the E chooses his2 eﬀort level e and at t3, the VC chooses her eﬀort level
a3.A tt4, the cash ﬂow of the project is realized and at t5, the contract is executed.
1We assume that 0 < B < min[pq 1
2βe∗
g
2;I −L(a∗
b)]. This assumption has two implications. First, bad
state projects are not socially proﬁtable as L(a∗
b)+B<I . Second, all privately proﬁtable projects manage
to be ﬁnanced in a private ﬁrst-best situation despite the limited liability of the E as B ≤ pq 1
2βe∗
g
2.F o r
details see Appendix A1.
2For the reader’s convenience in following my argumentation, I refer to the E as he/him and to the
VC as she/her.
3See subsection 6 for a comment on the impact of simultaneous eﬀort choice.
9As far as the distribution of information is concerned, we analyze two diﬀerent sce-
narios in order to be able to focus ﬁrst on the impact of the double-sided moral hazard
problem and the ex ante uncertainty and then on the impact of the double-sided adverse
selection problem. However, as mentioned before, even more decisive is the fact that these
scenarios can be interpreted as diﬀerent development stages of the venture capital market,
because only in an experienced market are the contracting parties able to acquire private
information ex ante. This distinction is crucial as the need for public intervention diﬀers
between experienced and inexperienced markets. In fact, we can frequently observe public
policy measures which are especially designed for immature markets. Then, however, it is
important to know whether these measures have to be absolutely cancelled when reaching
a certain development stage or whether they are not harmful in experienced markets.
Against this background, we deﬁne a ﬁrst scenario where we assume that no information
about the state of the project exists before contracting time (this can be interpreted as
the case of an inexperienced market), but that both contracting parties learn the state
of the project after the initial investment has sunk (see *). In a second step, we assume
that information does exist about the state of the project – thus we are confronted with
an experienced market – but we introduce a double-sided asymmetric information prob-
lem by assuming that the E and the VC each receive a private signal (see **). As the
E developed the innovative idea, we assume that he receives a perfect signal about the
technological quality of the project (¯ λ for a high quality and λ for a low quality project).
On the other hand, the VC has gained experience in the venture capital market and thus
she has private information about the perspectives of the product market, i.e. she receives
a perfect signal about the market conditions for the innovation (¯ η for good and η for bad
market conditions).
103 The Case of Inexperienced Venture Capital Markets
Below we will analyze the case of inexperienced markets where no information either about
the technological quality of the project or about the market conditions before contracting
exists. However, both contracting parties, the E and the VC, will learn the state of the
project before exerting their eﬀort levels. In a ﬁrst step, we will derive the ﬁrst-best
solution as a benchmark. In a second step, we will determine the market solution before
analyzing the inﬂuence of diﬀerent public policy programs on contract design.
3.1 The First-best Solution
A ﬁrst necessary step in the evaluation of public policy programs is to deﬁne the (public)
ﬁrst-best solution as a reference case. Let us deﬁne the entire social value of the project
W(θ) according to the state of the project θ with θ ∈{ bad, medium, good} as the sum
of the net value of the project and the spill-over eﬀect:
W(θ)=V (e,a,α,θ) −
1
2
βe
2 −
1
2
γa
2 − I + B + S(e,a,α) (6)
The public ﬁrst-best eﬃcient eﬀort levels for the three diﬀerent states are given by:
e
∗SP
b =0 and a
∗SP
b =
1
γ
∂l(a)
∂a
e
∗SP
m =0 and a
∗SP
m =0 (7)
e
∗SP
g =
(1 + ε)
β
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
and a
∗SP
g =
(1 + ε)
γ
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
In addition, it is eﬃcient to give the E control rights in at least one period in order to
conserve the private beneﬁts B. As regards the investment decision, an investment is
only proﬁtable from a social point of view if it is suﬃciently innovative, i.e. α ≥ αSP
11determined by the following equation:
¯ x(e
∗SP
g ,a
∗SP
g ,α
SP) −
1
2
βe
∗SP
g
2
−
1
2
γa
∗SP
g
2
+
B
pq
+ S(e
∗SP
g ,a
∗SP
g ,α
SP)=
I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗SP
b )] (8)
with L(a∗SP
b )=l(a∗SP
b ) − 1
2γa∗SP
b
2 and S(e∗SP
g ,a ∗SP
g ,α SP) being the spill-over eﬀect of a
project with the inherent innovative value αSP if public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels are chosen.
In a second step, we must determine the private ﬁrst-best solution. To this end, we
understand the ﬁrst-best solution as having a spill-over eﬀect of zero, as the VC and the
E will never consider the spill-over eﬀect, though they may be able to solve the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. In this case, the private ﬁrst-best eﬃcient eﬀort
levels for the three diﬀerent states are given by:
e
∗
b =0 and a
∗
b =
1
γ
∂l(a)
∂a
e
∗
m =0 and a
∗
m =0 (9)
e
∗
g =
1
β
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
and a
∗
g =
1
γ
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
A comparison of the private and the public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels shows an underinvest-
ment in eﬀort of both contracting parties in the good state of the project. In the medium
and bad states of the project, eﬀort levels are identical: a∗
b = a∗SP
b and a∗
m = a∗SP
m as
well as e∗
b = e∗SP
b and e∗
m = e∗SP
m . In order to simplify notation, we will use the ﬁrst
representation in these two states.
Moreover, it is still eﬃcient to give control rights to the E in at least one period. As
regards the investment decision, we know that the project is only proﬁtable from a private
point of view if α ≥ αPR determined by the following equation:
¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α
PR) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 +
B
pq
= I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗
b)] (10)
12By comparing equations (8) and (10), we see that αPR must be higher than αSP as
¯ x(e,a,α) is increasing in α. This means that less innovative projects which are still socially
proﬁtable are not proﬁtable for the economic agents and will not be ﬁnanced4.
3.2 The Market Solution
It is important to know whether the described private ﬁrst-best solution can be achieved
by the market and, if so, how the contract is to be designed. Hence, as a ﬁrst step, we will
see if a contract exists which induces private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting
parties and if the E has an incentive to choose this contract; and in a second step, we will
check if all privately proﬁtable projects are ﬁnanced.
Incentives in the good state can only be given by a compensation scheme which depends
on the realized outcome. Thus debt cannot be eﬃcient in the good state of the project
– however, it is in the bad state because only the VC has to get an incentive to exert
eﬀort. Equity, on the other hand, gives suboptimal incentives in both bad and good states
because it is impossible to make both parties full residual claimants at the same time.
These problems cannot be solved by debt-equity mixes either. However, following the
insights of Schmidt [2003], we show that adequately designed preferred stock contracts
also provide eﬃcient incentives to both contracting parties in our sequential double-sided
moral hazard framework.
Proposition 1 The E oﬀers the VC a contract of convertible preferred stock which imple-
ments the private ﬁrst-best situation. This contract guarantees the VC a limited preferred
dividend of D and the right to convert the preferred stock into an equity stake sCV
1 in t4
4We further assume that ¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α)− 1
2βe∗
g
2 − 1
2γa∗
g
2 + B
pq ≤ x(e∗
g,δ,α) and (1+ε)¯ x(e∗SP
g ,a ∗SP
g ,α)−
1
2βe∗SP
g
2− 1
2γa∗SP
g
2+ B
pq ≤ (1+ε)x(e∗SP
g ,δ,α). This assumption ensures that the basic mechanism of the
convertible security works for all privately (socially) proﬁtable projects. Otherwise, the range of projects
which get ﬁnanced would be smaller as private (social) ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels would not be implementable
for all projects. Details see appendix A1.
13if the project’s surplus reaches at least the threshold z:
D = C = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗
b)]
s
CV
1 =
C +0 ,5γa∗
g
2
[¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α)]
z =¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α)
Proof 1 See appendix.
The idea behind proposition 1 is as follows. Convertible preferred stock contracts are
able to implement the private ﬁrst-best situation because they combine the advantages
of both debt and equity: they function as pure debt contracts in the bad and medium
states of the project, that which is eﬃcient, yet, the conversion option simultaneously
guarantees an eﬃcient outcome in the good state. This is due to the following: the VC is
a full residual claimant in the bad state and thus chooses the eﬃcient eﬀort level, while
in the good state when debt contracts are no longer eﬃcient, the threshold z guarantees
that the VC will not choose a suboptimal eﬀort level, and the sequential eﬀort decision
structure guarantees that the E has an incentive to choose the threshold z in such a way
that he also has an incentive to choose his private ﬁrst-best eﬀort level. As private ﬁrst-
best eﬀort levels can be induced in this way without paying a rent to the VC, the E’s
proﬁt is maximized. Finally, as the limited liability constraint is not binding, all privately
proﬁtable projects get ﬁnanced.
3.3 The Inﬂuence of Public Intervention on Contract Design
In the previous subsection, we pointed out that the market is able to solve the prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection by using adequately designed ﬁnancial instru-
ments, namely convertible preferred stock contracts. Thus the private ﬁrst-best situation
14is reached allowing public policy programs to focus on internalizing the spill-over eﬀect
due to successful innovation. As a broad range of public policy programs exists, it is im-
portant to know their eﬀects on contract design and the individual behavior if suitable
public policy measures are to be identiﬁed.
Below, we will look at ﬁve diﬀerent public policy categories: ex post grants, guarantee
programs, ex ante grants, investment grants and public support. In doing so, we will
determine the design of each public policy measure necessary in order to get the highest
possible percentage of socially proﬁtable projects ﬁnanced5. Given this public policy
measure, we will derive the optimal contract design between the E and the VC. Here, it
is important to bear in mind that we assume that the contracting parties are not able to
write any side contracts because the public institution requires all contractual documents
related to the relationship in order to avoid misuse of support programs – a fact that
is frequently observed in practice. Moreover, in order to concentrate on our analysis,
we assume lump-sum ﬁnancing of public policy programs. Finally, we need to make an
assumption about the observability and veriﬁability of the inherent innovative value α of
each project. For the following analysis, we assume that it is not observable ex ante by the
public institution. In section 5, we will expand on two alternative assumptions. However,
it is important to consider that an ex post discrimination is always possible due to the
veriﬁability of the generated surplus.
Ex post Grants
Ex post grants can be made contingent on the outcome of the project. Therefore, the
grant can be paid to the E only when a spill-over eﬀect exists and furthermore, the grant
5For the sake of simpliﬁcation, we assume that the spill-over eﬀect exceeds a speciﬁc minimum level:
S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α PR) >
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [L(a∗
b)−l(0)]. This assumption guarantees that all projects that are privately
proﬁtable without intervention are at least socially proﬁtable with intervention, even when taking into
account possible lower eﬀort levels resulting from the public intervention itself.
15can be proportional to the actual outcome. Now the question is what inﬂuence this policy
instrument has on the contract mechanisms and whether it is possible to achieve the
public ﬁrst-best situation.
We know that whereas in the bad and medium states, nothing changes as the E does
not receive a grant, in the good state, the cash-ﬂow of the project increases. Furthermore,
we have shown in proof 1 that with adequately designed convertible securities, the E will
get the project’s net surplus and has therefore an incentive to implement private ﬁrst-best
eﬀort levels. As the amount of the ex post grant equally depends on the eﬀort levels of
both contracting parties, the E will get an incentive to further increase the eﬀort levels.
Indeed, if we assume that the public institution pays an ex post grant of ζ¯ x(e,a,α) for
V> Iand solve the E’s modiﬁed maximization problem analogously to proof 1, we get
the following results: all incentive constraints are still fulﬁlled for D = C – i.e. the basic
mechanism of the convertible security remains unchanged – and the eﬀort levels which
maximize the E’s proﬁt now amount to
e
∗ =
(1 + ζ)
β
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
a
∗ =
(1 + ζ)
γ
(1 + ζ)∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
(11)
So in order to induce public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels ζ must be equal to ε. Then the E
modiﬁes the threshold to zEPG =¯ x(e∗SP
g ,a ∗SP
g ,α) in order to implement public ﬁrst-best
eﬀort levels. Moreover, he adapts the conversion stake in order to guarantee that the VC’s
participation constraint continues to be binding, i.e.
s
CV
1,EPG =
C + 1
2γa∗SP
g
2
(1 + ε)¯ x(e∗SP
g ,a ∗SP
g ,α)
with C = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗
b)] (12)
This implies that the E’s proﬁt corresponds to the net social surplus of the project and
thus the E’s participation constraint is fulﬁlled for all socially proﬁtable projects. As the
E’s limited liability constraint is not binding, the public ﬁrst-best situation is achieved.
16We can sum up our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Paying the E an ex post grant EPG = ε¯ x(e,a,α) for V> Igives the E
an incentive to oﬀer modiﬁed preferred stock contracts which induce public ﬁrst-best eﬀort
levels. All socially proﬁtable projects get ﬁnanced. Welfare is maximized.
Proof 2 Analogous to proof 1 taking into account the modiﬁcations mentioned.
Guarantee Programs
As already pointed out, there are (were) many public policy programs of which the purpose
is (was) to promote VC ﬁnancing by reducing the possible loss for the VC in case of failure.
For simpliﬁcation, we assume that risk is totally taken on by the public institution, i.e.
the VC gets back her initial investment I even if the project is in the bad state. We again
study the eﬀect of this policy instrument on contract design and the resulting market
outcome.
We know that whereas in the good and medium states nothing changes, as the initial
investment amount is always guaranteed, in the bad state the payoﬀ of the VC now
amounts to
Π
VC
b,GP = I −
1
2
γa
2 (13)
while the monetary payoﬀ of the E continues to be 0. This change has a crucial impact
on the VC’s incentives as she will now choose an eﬀort level of 0 in order to maximize her
payoﬀ. At the same time, this implies that the expected social net value of all projects
that would have been ﬁnanced without intervention is reduced to E[W(α)] with:
E[W(α)] = pq[¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 + S(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α)]
+ [(1 − p)q +( 1− q)p]I +( 1− p)(1 − q)l(0) + B − I (14)
17Furthermore, the least innovative socially proﬁtable project has also to be more innovative
than in a public ﬁrst-best situation. In fact, the least innovative project which is still
socially proﬁtable under these conditions has only an innovative value of αab=0 given by
E[W(αab=0)] = 0 for which αPR >α ab=0 >α SP holds.
As the guarantee program ensures the VC her initial investment in the bad state
of the project but does not change the payoﬀ structures otherwise, the E’s maximization
problem is only slightly modiﬁed. Analogous to proof 1, it can be shown that the incentive
constraints continue to hold for D = C. Thus the basic mechanism of the convertible
security remains unchanged: the E still chooses zGP =¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) in order to implement
private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels. The only diﬀerence is that the E has an incentive to adapt
the conversion stake in such a way that the VC’s participation constraint continues to be
binding, i.e.
s
CV
1,GP =
C + 1
2γa∗
g
2
¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α)
with C = I (15)
This implies that the E’s expected proﬁt increases to:
Π
E
GP(α)=pq[¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 − I]+B (16)
Since – just as in proof 1 – the E’s limited liability constraint is not binding, all projects
for which ΠE
GP ≥ 0 will get ﬁnanced. When we compare the socially optimal investment
decision (see 14) with the private one, we see that if
S(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α GP)=
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − l(0)] (17)
holds, all socially proﬁtable projects under these conditions get ﬁnanced. If condition (17)
holds only with >, more but not all socially proﬁtable projects will get ﬁnanced and if it
holds only with <, even socially unproﬁtable projects will get ﬁnanced.
The following proposition summarizes our results:
18Proposition 3 Guarantee programs bring about a decrease in the eﬀort level of the VC
to 0 in the bad state of the project, implying a worsened outcome for all projects that
would have been ﬁnanced without introduction of the guarantee program. More, but not
all, socially proﬁtable projects (under these conditions) are ﬁnanced if the spill-over eﬀect
is relatively large. In the reverse case, even socially unproﬁtable projects get ﬁnanced. The
total welfare eﬀect depends on the parameters.
Proof 3 Analogous to proof 1 taking into account the modiﬁcations mentioned.
Ex ante Grants
It is important to distinguish between ex post and ex ante grants as the former can depend
on the outcome while the latter are just ﬁxed support payments. Thus ex ante grants do
not give any further incentives in medium and good states but they do relax the E’s
participation and limited liability constraints in all states. Therefore, the impact of this
measure is somewhat similar to that of guarantee programs.
In fact, as ex ante grants are ﬁxed support payments, they may only change the VC’s
incentives in the bad state. Thereby, their impact depends on the size of the ex ante grant.
If the ex ante grant is relatively large (i.e. EAG > D−l(0)), the VC’s claim is guaranteed
independently of her eﬀort level and thus she chooses a =0 . For a medium-sized ex ante
grant (i.e. D − l(a∗
b) ≤ E A G<D− l(0)), the VC chooses a =ˆ aEAG
b ∈ (0,a ∗
b] so that her
claim is just guaranteed, i.e. l(ˆ aEAG
b )+EAG = D. Finally, with a relatively small ex ante
grant (EAG < D− l(a∗
b)), the VC always gets the total surplus of the project in the bad
state and so has an incentive to invest eﬃciently.
As ex ante grants do not change incentives in medium and good states, the basic
mechanism of the convertible security remains unchanged. Indeed, analogous to proof 1,
19it can be shown that the E still has an incentive to choose zEAG =¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) in order
to induce private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting parties in the good state.
Moreover, the incentive constraints continue to be fulﬁlled for D = C. However, as the
outcome of the project is higher in all states and thus the E’s limited liability constraints
are relaxed, the VC’s claim in the good state has to be adapted to
s
CV
1,EAG =
C + 1
2γa∗
g
2
¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α)+EAG
(18)
in order to ensure that her participation constraint continues to be binding. The VC’s
claim C depends on the size of the ex ante grant. We have to distinguish between the
three cases mentioned:
Case 1: EAG > D − l(0): The VC’s initial investment is always guaranteed. Thus a
binding PC(VC) requires CEAG
1 = D = I.
Case 2: D − l(a∗
b) <E A G<D− l(0): The VC’s initial investment is only guaranteed
if the VC chooses an eﬀort level of ˆ aEAG
b ∈ (0,a ∗
b].A sl(a∗
b) <I , D is always
guaranteed in the medium state. A binding PC(VC) requires CEAG
2 = I +(1−
p)(1 − q)1
2γadev.
b
2
Case 3: EAG ≤ D − l(a∗
b): The claim of the VC is never guaranteed in the bad state.
As regards the medium state, we have to distinguish two subcases:
Subcase a: EAG > D − I: Here the claim is always guaranteed in the medium state
and a binding PC(VC) demands
CEAG
3a = I +
(1−p)(1−q)
1−(1−p)(1−q)[I − L(a∗
b) − EAG]
Subcase b: EAG < D − I: Here the claim is never guaranteed in the medium state
and a binding PC(VC) demands
CEAG
3b = I +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − L(a∗
b)] −
1−pq
pq EAG.
20We can see that the larger the ex ante grant, the smaller the VC’s claim C.
As far as the socially optimal investment decision with the introduction of the ex
ante grant is concerned, we know that the least innovative project which is still socially
proﬁtable depends on the eﬀort level of the VC in the bad state (ˆ ai
EAG) and is determined
by the following equation:
¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α ab=ˆ ai
EAG) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 +
B
pq
=
I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
i)] − S(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α ab=ˆ ai
EAG) (19)
In comparison, the private investment decision is determined by the E’s participation
as well as his limited liability constraint in the good state. In the basic case without
intervention his limited liability constraint is automatically fulﬁlled when his participation
constraint holds. However, as with ex ante grants, the E may even receive proﬁts in bad
and medium states (see cases 1 and 2 as well as subcase 3a), his limited liability constraint
may become binding in good states instead. This is the more probable, the higher the E’s
expected proﬁts in bad and medium states (E(Y )) and the lower the diﬀerence between
the E’s eﬀort costs in the good state and his private beneﬁt A = pq 1
2βe∗
g
2 − B. If the E’s
limited liability constraint is binding in the good state, a project must exceed the critical
innovative value αab=ˆ ai
EAG given by:
¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α ab=ˆ ai
EAG) −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 = C
EAG
i − EAG (20)
in order to get ﬁnanced. Consequently, in these cases, the public institution has to pay
the following ex ante grant in order to make private and social minimum levels of the
inherent innovative value coincide:
EAG = S(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α) − [I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
i)] − C
EAG
i ] −
A
pq
(21)
21If the participation constraint is binding, the range of privately proﬁtable projects is
determined by:
¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α ab=ˆ ai
EAG) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 +
B
pq
≥ C
EAG
i − EAG −
1
pq
E(Y ) (22)
In this case, the optimal amount of the ex ante grants must correspond to
EAG = S(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α ab=a∗
b) − [I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
i)] − C
EAG
i ] −
1
pq
E(Y ) (23)
in order to get all socially proﬁtable projects ﬁnanced. The optimal ex ante grants as well
as the resulting optimal contracts for the diﬀerent cases as well as for diﬀerent levels of
A are given in the appendix (see table 8.3).
The welfare impact of ex ante grants depends on their size which determines the
outcome in the bad state depending on the size of the spill-over eﬀect. According to table
8.3,
- for a small A, the eﬀort level of the VC is lower than the eﬃcient level if S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α PR) >
[I − l(a∗
b)] +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − L(a∗
b)] + A
pq;
- for a larger A, this is the case for
S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α PR) > 1
pq[I − l(a∗
b)] +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [1
2γa∗
b
2].
To be more precise, the higher the spill-over eﬀect the lower the eﬀort level. If the VC’s
eﬀort level in the bad state is lower than the eﬃcient one, then the net value of all projects
which would have been ﬁnanced without intervention is reduced. As more projects get
ﬁnanced, the aggregate welfare eﬀect depends on the parameters. If the spill-over eﬀect
is smaller, the VC continues to choose his eﬃcient eﬀort level in the bad state and so the
aggregate welfare eﬀect is positive. We can sum up our results in the following proposition:
22Proposition 4 Ex ante grants may bring about a decrease in the eﬀort level of the VC in
the bad state, implying a worsened outcome for all projects that would have been ﬁnanced
without introduction of the ex ante grant. This eﬀect is the more pronounced, the larger the
spill-over eﬀect and does not exist at all for relatively small spill-over eﬀects. All socially
proﬁtable projects (under these conditions) get ﬁnanced. The total welfare eﬀect depends
on the parameters for relatively large spill-over eﬀects and is positive for relatively small
spill-over eﬀects.
Proof 4 Analogous to proof 1 taking into account the modiﬁcations mentioned.
Investment Grants
Governments also frequently aim to promote innovative companies by channelling further
funds into the venture capital industry. Here, we will focus on two forms which are fre-
quently encountered in practice: re-ﬁnancing and co-ﬁnancing. Thereby, we will restrict
our analysis to the most basic case in order to reveal the underlying mechanisms: the
public institution assumes part of the investment costs I∗ (τI) in exchange for a ﬁxed
claim D∗ = I∗ (equity claim τ), i.e. the investment grant does not involve any further
costs for the VC. Moreover, we assume that the public institution does not provide any
know-how neither to the VC nor directly to the E6.
Finally, we will describe two cases as regards the distribution of the liquidation value
in the bad state. On the one hand, we assume that the liquidation value is divided between
the contracting parties proportionally to their contribution to the investment costs; on the
other hand, we assume that the VC has a form of liquidation preference which guarantees
that she preferably gets back her contribution to the investment costs. As the project’s
6We will analyze this form of additional support separately in the next subsection.
23outcome V (e,a,α,θ) ≥ I for θ = {medium, good}, we assume that the public institution’s
claim has always to be fulﬁlled by the VC in these states.
We will begin by determining the inﬂuence of re-financing schemes. Analogous to
proof 1, we can ﬁrst determine the choice of eﬀort levels. Here, it is important to note that
the public institution does not negotiate directly with the E but that the VC continues to
negotiate the whole contract with the E while subcontracting with the public institution.
As the VC continues to be the full residual claimant of the E’s payment in the good state
(the public institution only receives a ﬁxed payment which is always smaller in equilibrium
than the total payment of the E), the basic mechanism of the convertible security remains
unchanged. This means that the E will still choose zEAG =¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) in order to induce
private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting parties and that all incentive constraints
continue to be fulﬁlled for D = C.
In the bad state of the project, however, the VC’s eﬀort choice depends on the design
of the support program. If the VC holds a liquidation preference, we have to distinguish
between three cases:
1. I − I∗ ≥ l(a∗
b): In this case, the VC gets the total surplus of the project in the bad
state what implies that she continues to choose a∗
b.
2. l(0) <I− I∗ <l (a∗
b): In this case, the VC must choose only ˆ a
IG1−LP
b ∈ (0,a ∗
b) in
order to guarantee her claim. Thus she will underinvest in eﬀort.
3. I −I∗ ≤ l(0): In this case, the VC’s claim is guaranteed independently of her eﬀort
level and thus she will choose ab =0 .
Furthermore, we have to take into account the VC’s modiﬁed participation constraint
which the E still wants to be binding. Thereby, the modiﬁed claim C of the VC depends
24on the size of the investment costs assumed by the public institution and amounts for the
three cases mentioned to:
C
IG1−LP
1 = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − I
∗ − L(a
∗
b)]
C
IG1−LP
2 = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − I
∗ − L(ˆ a
IG1−LP
b )] (24)
C
IG1−LP
3 = I
As the E’s limited liability constraint in the good state is automatically fulﬁlled when his
participation constraint holds, all projects for which the following condition is valid will
get ﬁnanced:
¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 +
B
pq
≥ C
i
IG1−LP (25)
This implies that in order to get all socially proﬁtable projects ﬁnanced, the public insti-
tution must assume
I
∗
LP =
pq
(1 − p)(1 − q)
S(e
∗
g,a
∗
G,α ab=ˆ ai
IG1−LP) (26)
the innovative value of the least innovative but still socially proﬁtable project αab=ˆ ai
IG1−LP
depending on the eﬀort level chosen by the VC in the bad state. Note, however, that
for S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=0) >
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − l(0)], the claim C no longer depends on the size of I∗.
Therefore, in this case, it will never be possible to induce ﬁnancing of all socially proﬁtable
projects and the public institution will choose I∗ =[ I −l(0)] irrespective of the extent of
the spill-over eﬀect.
If the VC does not hold a liquidation preference but the claims of both contracting
parties in the bad state are equally ranked, the VC will always underinvest in eﬀort
in the bad state. In fact, she will choose the eﬀort level which maximizes her payoﬀ:
ˆ a
IG1−NLP
b = I−I∗
Iγ
∂l(a)
∂a . Thus we have to determine the modiﬁed claim C which guarantees
25that the VC’s participation constraint continues to be binding:
C
IG1−NLP = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − I
∗ − L(ˆ a
IG−NLP
b )+
I∗
I
l(ˆ a
IG1−NLP
b )] (27)
Analogous to the case with a liquidation preference, the optimal contribution of the public
institution now amounts to
I
∗
NLP =
pq
(1 − p)(1 − q)[1 −
l(ˆ aIG1−NLP
b )
I ]
S(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α ab=ˆ aIG1−NLP) (28)
the innovative value of the least innovative but still socially proﬁtable projects αˆ aIG1−NLP
b
increasing in I∗. However, as I∗ ≤ I, for S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=0) >
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − l(0)], all socially
proﬁtable projects never get ﬁnanced.
Now, we will have a closer look at co-financing schemes. As the public institution
receives τ of the eﬀort compensation in the good state, we will further assume that it
compensates the VC for this forgone eﬀort costs, i.e. an additional agreement exists which
reduces the claim of the public institution by τ 1
2γa2 whenever conversion takes place. This
implies that analogous to the case of re-ﬁnancing schemes the underlying mechanism of
the convertible security remains unchanged7.
Thus we can again limit our analysis to the eﬀects of the two forms of co-ﬁnancing
schemes mentioned in the bad state of the project. If the VC holds a liquidation preference,
we have to distinguish between three analogous cases:
1. (1−τ)I ≥ l(a∗
b): In this case, the VC never receives her full claim what implies that
she gets the whole liquidation value. In turn, she continues to choose a∗
b.
2. l(0) < (1 − τ)I<l (a∗
b): In this case, the VC must choose only ˆ a
IG2−LP
b ∈ (0,a ∗
b) in
order to guarantee her claim. Thus she will underinvest in eﬀort.
7Otherwise, the E would have to adjust the conversion stake in order to be able to implement the
convertible security and the outcome would always be worse than with our simplifying assumption.
263. (1 − τ)I ≤ l(0): In this case, the VC’s claim is guaranteed independently of her
eﬀort level and thus she will choose ab =0 .
If the VC does not hold a liquidation preference, she will maximize her outcome in the
bad state by choosing ˆ a
IG2−NLP
b =
(1−τ)
γ
∂l(a)
∂a . For all cases we then need to determine the
claim C which is necessary in order to guarantee that the VC’s participation constraint
is binding:
C
IG2−LP
1 = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I −
L(a∗
b)
1 − τ
]
C
IG2−LP
2 = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I −
L(ˆ a
IG1−LP
b )
1 − τ
] (29)
C
IG2−LP
3 = I
C
IG2−NLP = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(ˆ a
IG−NLP
b )+
τ
(1 − τ)
1
2
γ(ˆ a
IG1−NLP
b )
2]
Analogous to the case of re-ﬁnancing schemes, comparing the private with the socially
optimal ﬁnancing decision yields the optimal τ∗. As concerns the case without a liquidation
preference, we see that CIG2−NLP is always larger than the claim C = I +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I −
L(a∗
b)] without intervention. This implies that less projects get ﬁnanced and that therefore,
co-ﬁnancing schemes without a liquidation preference should never be implemented in this
basic form. As regards the implementation with a liquidation preference, the optimal τ is
given by
τ =
S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=ˆ ai
IG2−LP)
S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=ˆ ai
IG2−LP)+
(1−p)(1−q)
pq L(a
IG2−LPi
b )
(30)
for case 1 and 2. In case 3, the value of τ does not have any inﬂuence on the ﬁnancing
decision. This implies that for S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=0) >
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − l(0)], all socially proﬁtable
projects never get ﬁnanced and τ∗ =
I−l(0)
I irrespective of the extent of the spill-over
eﬀect.
Thus, we are able to show that the impact of investment grants greatly depends on
27the concrete design of the program. The proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 5 If the VC holds a liquidation preference in the bad state, both types of
investment grants are welfare-increasing if the spill-over eﬀect is suﬃciently small. If
the spill-over eﬀect is medium (large), all (more) socially proﬁtable projects (under the
corresponding conditions) are ﬁnanced but now the outcome of all projects which would
have been ﬁnanced without the introduction of the investment grant is reduced due to the
negative incentive eﬀect in the bad state. Thus the total welfare eﬀect depends on the
parameters.
If the VC does not hold a liquidation preference, investment grants always have a negative
incentive eﬀect in the bad state. As with re-ﬁnancing schemes all, or at least more socially
proﬁtable projects are ﬁnanced, the total welfare eﬀect depends again on the parameters.
With co-ﬁnancing schemes, however, the project range is not enlarged. Thus they are
welfare-decreasing in this case.
Proof 5 Analogous to proof 1 taking into account the modiﬁcations mentioned.
Public Support
Public support, such as technical assistance or access to networks, may decrease the eﬀort
costs of VCs and Es. As its objective is to internalize the spill-over eﬀect, the public
institution aims at decreasing the VC’s costs for managerial contributions as well as the
E’s costs for technological development but not the VC’s costs for selling oﬀ the assets.
Moreover, public support should only bring about an eﬀect while the measure is in force
and thus training programs which aim at ultimately reducing the costs are not suitable
for internalizing the spill-over eﬀect.
This means that the public institution supports both contracting parties by reducing
28their eﬀort costs in the good state to
c(e)PS =
1
2
κβe
2
c(a)PS =
1
2
κγa
2 (31)
Taking into account these modiﬁed eﬀort costs and solving the E’s modiﬁed maximization
problem analogous to proof 1 yields the following results: the incentive constraints are
still fulﬁlled for D = C8– i.e. the basic mechanism of the convertible security remains
unchanged – and the eﬀort levels which maximize the E’s proﬁt now amount to
e
∗ =
1
κβ
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
a
∗ =
1
κγ
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
We can see that the lower κ, i.e. the higher the support by the public institution, the
higher the implemented eﬀort levels will be. Indeed, if κ amounts to 1
1+ε, the E has an
incentive to choose zPS =¯ x(e∗SP
g ,a ∗SP
g ,α) in order to implement public ﬁrst-best eﬀort
levels. Furthermore, the E will adapt the post conversion stake to
s
CV
1,PS =
C + 1
2
γ
1+εa∗SP
g
2
¯ x(e∗SP
g ,a ∗SP
g ,α)
with C = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗
b)] (32)
in order to ensure that the VC’s participation constraint continues to be binding.
As concerns the investment decision, the E’s limited liability constraint continues to
be automatically fulﬁlled if the E’s participation constraint holds. This is due to the
fact that the E’s eﬀort costs are higher in equilibrium with public support than without
8Note, however, that in this case, we need even a more restrictive assumption as concerns the impact
of the E’s contribution in order to ensure the mechanism of the convertible security (see appendix A1),
namely (1+ε)¯ x(e∗SP,a ∗SP,α)− 1
2βe∗SP
g
2− 1
2γa∗SP
g
2+(1+ε) B
pq ≤ (1+ε)x(e∗SP
g ,δ,α). If this assumption
does not hold, the range of ﬁnanced projects will be smaller as indicated, the actual range depending on
the concrete parameter constellation.
29intervention. Consequently, the innovative value of the least innovative project which still
gets ﬁnanced (αPS) is given by the following condition:
1
1+ε
[(1 + ε)¯ x(e
∗SP
g ,a
∗SP
g ,α PS) −
1
2
βe
∗SP
g
2
−
1
2
γa
∗SP
g
2
]+
B
pq
=
I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗
b)] (33)
As regards the socially optimal investment decision with public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in
all three stages of the project, we know that all project with α ≥ αSP get ﬁnanced (see
equation 8). A comparison of both conditions shows that αSP <α PS: less innovative
projects which are still socially proﬁtable do not get ﬁnanced.
Thus the impact of public support can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 Public support implying a cost reduction by the factor κ = 1
1+ε for both
contracting parties in the good state induces public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting
parties in the good state. More, but not all, socially proﬁtable projects get ﬁnanced. Public
support is thus welfare-increasing.
Proof 6 Analogous to proof 1 taking into account the modiﬁcations mentioned.
4 The Case of Experienced Venture Capital Markets
Contrary to the previous analysis, in more experienced markets, ex ante information may
exist about the expected state of the project. We assume that the information is not freely
available but that both agents receive private signals before contracting: the E receives a
perfect signal about the product quality and the VC receives a perfect signal about the
market situation. Below, we will show how this altered situation changes our previous
results. We proceed analogous to the case of inexperienced markets: in a ﬁrst step, we
30will derive the ﬁrst-best solution as a benchmark; in a second step, we will determine the
market solution before analyzing the impact of the selected public policy measures on
contract design.
4.1 The First-best Solution
Analogous to the case of inexperienced markets, we will again determine the public and
private ﬁrst-best solutions as benchmarks. As regards eﬀort levels, nothing changes with
respect to the case of experienced markets as both contracting parties also knew the state
of the project before choosing their eﬀort levels. This means that, just as in the case of
inexperienced markets, private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels are suboptimal in the good state of
the project. Moreover, it continues to be eﬃcient to give the E control rights in at least
one period in order to conserve the private beneﬁts B. Moreover, as the true state of the
project is known before contracting, the investment decision for each state of the project
is taken separately. In the medium and good states, the outcome of the project amounts
to at least to the initial investment sum I, so that an investment is always proﬁtable; in
the bad state, on the other hand, L(a∗
b)+B<I , and thus, an investment is never socially
desirable. It is obvious that the private ﬁrst-best investment decisions do not diﬀer from
the derived public ﬁrst-best investment decisions because the latter are independent of
the size of the spill-over eﬀect.
4.2 The Market Solution
In this subsection, we will check – analogous to the case of inexperienced markets –
whether the derived private ﬁrst-best solution can be implemented by the market and
how the contract will be designed. Therefore, it is important to note that in experienced
31markets both contracting parties before contracting hold private information which they
may communicate by acting in a speciﬁc way. In the case of the E, this means that he may
oﬀer speciﬁc menus of contracts depending on the signal he received; and in the case of
the VC, this implies that she may communicate her private information by choosing one
speciﬁc contract or rejecting same. If both parties communicate their private information
truthfully, the state of the project can be deduced – if not, the parties must choose their
eﬀort levels in a state of uncertainty. Nevertheless, both parties may have incentives to
misstate their private information: the E may have an incentive to overstate his private
information in order to get bad state projects ﬁnanced and receive private beneﬁts; the
VC may have an incentive to understate her private information in order to get a higher
compensation. Therefore, the contract design is crucial; the allocation of control rights, in
particular, plays a key role. Indeed, in order to achieve an eﬃcient outcome, a contingent
control allocation is necessary. This is due to the fact that private beneﬁts get lost if the
VC holds the control rights and that the E will always have an incentive to overstate if
he holds them independently of the state of the project.
We know from proposition 1 that private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels can only be imple-
mented in all states by using adequately designed convertible preferred stock contracts.
Following the insights of Houben (2002), we will now show that adequately designed pre-
ferred stock contracts also implement this necessary contingent control allocation: they
transfer control rights to the VC but give the E the possibility to recover them by re-
deeming the preferred stock in the medium state but not in the bad state of the project.
Thus truth-revealing by both agents can be achieved without private beneﬁts being lost.
Proposition 7 The E oﬀers the VC the following truth-revealing contract(s):
- If he receives the bad signal λ, he oﬀers a contract which implies a preferred ﬁxed
32payment Db and which is redeemable at a price Pb at t4 if control rights are given
to the VC:
Db = I
Pb = Db
- If he receives the good signal ¯ λ, he oﬀers the following menu of contracts:
1. A redeemable voting preferred stock contract: the VC gets control and receives
a limited preferred dividend of Dm, but the E receives the right to redeem the
preferred stock at a price Pm at t4, with
Dm = I
Pm = Dm
2. A convertible preferred stock contract: the VC does not get control, but receives
a limited preferred dividend of Dg and the right to convert the preferred stock
into an equity stake sCV
2 in t4 if the surplus reaches at least the threshold z,
with
Dg = I
s
CV
2 =
I +0 ,5γa∗
g
2
¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α)
z =¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α).
In addition, these contracts always induce private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels.
Proof 7 See appendix.
The idea behind proposition 7 is as follows: As outlined before, the E reveals his private
information by oﬀering diﬀerent contracts to the VC and truth-revealing is achieved by
33the control transfer of the ﬁrst contract for high quality projects. Due to this control
transfer, the E does not have an incentive to overstate because he would not receive
private beneﬁts in the bad state even if the project got ﬁnanced. The VC, in turn, reveals
her private information by accepting the contract for low quality projects only if she
has received the good signal (otherwise, she knows that the project is in the bad state
and never proﬁtable), and by choosing the adequate contract according to her received
signal within the contract set for high quality projects. Here, truth-revealing by the VC
is guaranteed through the threshold z. Moreover, we know from proposition 1 that an
adequately designed conversion option implements private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in the
good state whereas a preferred ﬁxed payment contract is suﬃcient to achieve private
ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in bad and medium states.
4.3 The Inﬂuence of Public Intervention on Contract Design
In the previous subsection, we pointed out that the market is able to solve the double-
sided adverse selection as well as the double-sided moral hazard problem. Therefore, public
policy can focus on giving further incentives in the good state in order to ensure public
ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels. In what follows, we will analyze the impact of the selected public
policy measures. To be more precise, we will take the design of the diﬀerent public policy
measures which was optimal in the case of inexperienced markets and we will determine the
impact of these measures on the contract design in experienced markets. This procedure
enables us to show that some public policy measures are quite dangerous when the public
institution does not know for sure that it is confronted with an inexperienced market.
34Ex post Grants and Public Support
We know that ex post grants as well as public support do not have any impact on the
outcomes of the project in bad and medium states. In good states, on the contrary, the
E receives the ex post grant EPG = ε¯ x(e,a,α) or eﬀort costs are reduced by the factor
κ = 1
1+ε. Analogous to the case of inexperienced markets, the E thus gets the incentive
to modify the convertible security in order to implement public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in
the good state. As this modiﬁcation does not change the truth-revealing mechanism, the
investment decisions are not inﬂuenced by these programs. Consequently, both programs –
ex post grants and public support – are welfare-maximizing in experienced venture capital
markets.
Guarantee Programs, Ex ante Grants and Investment Grants
We know that guarantee programs, ex ante grants and investment grants do not change
the contracting parties’ incentives in medium and good states whereas in bad states,
incentives may be altered depending partially on the size of the spill-over eﬀect (see
section 3.3). However, as shown in subsection 4.2, bad state projects do not get ﬁnanced
in equilibrium in experienced markets without intervention. Consequently, this impact
should be irrelevant. Below, we will show, however, that the E may have an incentive to
deviate from the derived optimal contract sets in order to get bad state projects ﬁnanced
and receive private beneﬁts of control. In fact, the E has an incentive to overstate his
private information whenever the following two conditions are fulﬁlled: ﬁrst, he must gain
private beneﬁts in the bad state of the project, and second, the VC must truthfully reveal
her private information when the E oﬀers the same set of contracts irrespective of the
signal he receives. This is only possible if a joint contract exists for bad and medium
35states for which the VC’s participation constraint is binding.
Without public intervention, this will never be the case in our framework due to the
limited liability constraint of the E. It can be achieved, however, through public policy
measures which relax the E’s limited liability constraint at least in the bad state of the
project. With guarantee programs, for example, the VC is protected against losses in bad
states. So the E is able to oﬀer a ﬁxed payment contract Dm = I which fulﬁlls the VC’s
participation constraint in bad and medium states. However, it is important that this
contract no longer includes a control transfer to the VC in order to enable the E to obtain
private beneﬁts in the bad state (where he would not be able to redeem the preferred
stock contract). This implies that the E will oﬀer the following modiﬁed set of contracts,
irrespective of the signal he receives:
1. A ﬁxed payment contract which does not give control rights to the VC but only guar-
antees a ﬁxed payment Dm = I.
2. A convertible preferred stock contract analogous to proposition 7.
It can easily be seen that the VC will continue to truthfully reveal her private information:
if she receives the good signal, she may be able to convert, thus she chooses the second
contract which also fulﬁlls her participation constraint when conversion is not possible, i.e.
in the medium state. If she receives the bad signal, she knows that conversion will never
be possible and thus she will choose the ﬁrst contract. This result is strengthened by the
fact that truth-revealing will enable the VC to identify the good state of the project by
observing the E’s eﬀort level and thus choose her private ﬁrst-best eﬀort level and induce
conversion.
The same is true for investment grants with a liquidation preference of the VC as well
as ex ante grants provided that the spill-over eﬀect is relatively large. This condition is
necessary because a ﬁxed payment contract with Dm = I only fulﬁlls the VC’s partici-
36pation constraint if the VC’s claim is guaranteed in the bad state without exerting any
eﬀort. Otherwise, the E must pay a mark-up to the VC, i.e. Dm = I +( 1− p)1
2γˆ a2.B u t
then the E has an incentive to oﬀer the contract set of proposition 7 when he receives the
good signal in order to avoid paying the markup in medium states. Thus, the VC will be
able to deduce the true state of the project and consequently, the E will also adapt the
bad signal contract so that in equilibrium, the contracts of proposition 7 will be oﬀered.
Taking the optimal design of the diﬀerent support programs derived in subsection 3.3
as given, we know that for investment grants with a liquidation preference (regardless of
the type of grant), the VC’s claim in the bad state is only guaranteed without exerting any
eﬀort if the spill-over eﬀect exceeds the critical level of S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=0)=
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I−l(0)].
If the spill-over eﬀect is smaller or the VC does not hold a liquidation preference, the E
does not have an incentive to overstate and thus investment grants only have distributional
eﬀects.
Finally, as far as ex ante grants are concerned, the E has an incentive to overstate
whenever EAG+l(0) ≥ I. As can be seen in table 8.3, this is given for S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=0) >
A
pq +[ 1+
(1−p)(1−q)
pq ][I − l(0)] for a relatively small A while for a relatively large A,
S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α ab=0) > 1
pq[I − l(0)]. In this case, the E will always be able to compensate
the VC in the bad state of the project and so he will oﬀer the same set of contracts as in
the case of guarantee programs irrespective of the signal he receives. If the spill-over eﬀect
is smaller (just as in the case of investment grants), the E no longer has an incentive to
overstate his private information. Thus he will oﬀer the contracts of proposition 7.
375 Summary of the Inﬂuence of Public Intervention on
Contract Design
To sum up, an overview of the inﬂuence of the analyzed public policy programs on contract
design for both experienced and inexperienced markets is presented. We distinguish be-
tween two cases: the indications without parentheses refer to the case of a large spill-over
eﬀect – S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) > [1 +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq ][I − l(0)] + A
pq – while the indications in parentheses
refer to the case of a small spill-over eﬀect: S(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) ≤
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − l(0)]9. Moreover,
as concerns ex ante grants, we report the results of a relatively small A10.
The second column of the table indicates whether the public policy program increases
the contracting parties incentives in the good state to public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels. The
next three columns refer to the case of inexperienced markets. The third column indicates
the inherent innovative value of the least innovative project which still gets ﬁnanced,
given the respective policy intervention. In the fourth column, we show the impact of
the public policy program on all projects which would also have been ﬁnanced without
intervention – provided that the public institution cannot observe the innovative value
of each project α as in our analyses of section 3.3. The last column with respect to
inexperienced markets points out the total welfare eﬀect of each public policy measure.
Thereby, we make three diﬀerent assumptions about the observability of the inherent
innovative value by the public institution: non-observability as in the analyses of section
3.3; the observability of two groups of projects with an inherent innovative value larger
9For
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − l(0)] <S (e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) ≤ [1 +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq ][I − l(0)] + A
pq, the only change – compared
to the case of a large spill-over eﬀect – concerns ex-ante grants: the minimum inherent innovative value
increases in inexperienced markets and they are no longer welfare-decreasing in experienced markets with
a small A.
10More concretely for A< [(1-p)q+(1-q)p][I-l(0)]. The results do not change fundamentally, however
for a larger A. The only diﬀerence is a change in the respective critical values of the spill-over eﬀect.
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39or smaller than αPR; and the observability of the inherent innovative value α of each
project. Under the second assumption, the public institution would not oﬀer support to
all those projects which would have been ﬁnanced without intervention (i.e. all projects
with an inherent innovative value of α ≥ αPR) and whose outcome is not increased by
the intervention. Under assumption three, support can decrease with an increase in the
innovative value which, in turn, increases the outcome of these projects because of the
limitation of the negative incentive eﬀects11.
As we can see in the table, independently of the size of the spill-over eﬀect and the
assumption about the observability of α, only ex post grants maximize the welfare in
both experienced and inexperienced markets but public support maximizes welfare in
experienced markets and continues to be welfare-increasing in inexperienced markets. In-
vestment grants, ex ante grants and guarantee programs (with a large spill-over eﬀect)
are welfare-increasing in inexperienced markets if the public institution can divide the
projects into at least two groups. If this is not the case, their welfare eﬀect will depend on
the parameters. However, it is important to emphasize the fact that guarantee programs
are always welfare-decreasing in experienced markets whereas ex ante grants and invest-
ment grants with a liquidation preference of the VC are only welfare-decreasing with a
large spill-over eﬀect.
6 Robustness Checks
We will now introduce an alternative speciﬁcation of the spill-over eﬀect in order to
check our results for robustness. It is clear that a spill-over eﬀect which depends on the
eﬀort choices can only be internalized by giving additional incentives to the contracting
11Note that with this assumption, the above determined optimal support schemes would apply only
for the least innovative socially proﬁtable project.
40parties. This reduces the set of possible optimal public policy measures. Therefore, we
will check our results for a spill-over eﬀect which is independent of the eﬀort levels. Let
S(α) be the spill-over eﬀect for a project with V> Iand the inherent innovative value
α. This implies one crucial change with respect to our previous analyses: private ﬁrst-
best eﬀort levels now correspond to public ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in all three states of
the project. Thus in inexperienced markets, public intervention can focus on getting all
socially proﬁtable projects ﬁnanced whereas in experienced markets, there is no longer any
need for public intervention. Still, our qualitative results do not change considerably with
this alternative speciﬁcation. Ex post grants continue to be welfare-maximizing in both
scenarios. Investment grants with a liquidation preference and ex ante grants can maximize
social welfare in inexperienced markets with a relatively small spill-over eﬀect and are
otherwise welfare-enhancing if the public institution can identify the two groups of projects
mentioned. In the latter case, investment grants (with re-ﬁnancing schemes) without a
liquidation preference and guarantee programs with a relatively large spill-over eﬀect are
also welfare-enhancing. In experienced markets, however, guarantee programs are still
always welfare-decreasing and ex ante grants and investment grants with a liquidation
preference continue to be welfare-decreasing with a large spill-over eﬀect. Moreover, it is
obvious that public support is no longer an adequate instrument. Thus the introduction
of this alternative speciﬁcation seems to strengthen our results about the robustness and
riskiness of the diﬀerent public policy programs.
A further point that we wish to comment upon is our assumption of risk-neutrality for
both contracting parties. The assumption of risk-neutral Es is deemed to be maintainable
as the latter do not invest any private wealth in the project. With respect to the VCs,
it could be argued that they can be modelled as being risk-neutral because they hold a
diversiﬁed portfolio of companies. But the question is whether our results are robust for
41contracting with risk-averse VCs. The answer is yes. We wish to illustrate this out by
means of guarantee programs, which are often considered as aiming at contracting with
risk-averse agents. Without a guarantee program, we are confronted with the traditional
trade-oﬀ between giving incentives and oﬀering risk insurance. We will never achieve an
optimal risk allocation and projects will only get ﬁnanced if the project is suﬃciently
innovative so that the risk premium can be paid by the E in the good state of the project.
A guarantee program ensures an optimal risk allocation, and less innovative but socially
proﬁtable projects will get ﬁnanced. The mechanisms, however, do not change in com-
parison to the case of risk-neutral VCs. The same is true for experienced markets: risk
aversion does not have any inﬂuence if the truth-revealing condition, which eliminates the
project’s risk, is achieved.
A ﬁnal point of the model which could attract criticism is the fact that the double-
sided moral hazard problem can be solved by the market due to speciﬁc assumptions
of the model. One reply might be that the deduced type of contract is empirically well
conﬁrmed. Moreover, the aim of the paper was to focus on public policy strategies in
order to internalize the spill-over eﬀect related to innovation – a stated purpose in many
policy agendas. But what would it mean for our results if the double-sided moral hazard
problem were not solved by the market? If the private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels were not
implemented by the market, the government would have to provide further incentives to
increase eﬀort levels. As shown above, this can only be achieved through ex post grants
and public support. The other programs would have the same eﬀects on the range of
ﬁnanced projects and the contract mechanisms as described, only the eﬀort levels would
be even more suboptimal than in the case of our framework. Thus, the qualitative results
concerning the robustness of ex post grants and the riskiness of guarantee programs, ex
ante grants and investment grants with a liquidation preference would not change, but
42the advantages of ex post grants would grow as they could also provide these further
incentives.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed diﬀerent public policy programs by placing special emphasis on their
impact on contract design. Therefore, we adapted the sequential double-sided moral haz-
ard framework of Schmidt [2003] and the double-sided adverse selection framework of
Houben [2002] in order to compare the results of both frameworks and make these mod-
els tractable for the purposes of this paper. Furthermore, we allowed for the necessity of
public intervention by incorporating a spill-over eﬀect which may be proportional to the
outcome of the successful project and can then be inﬂuenced by both parties through
their eﬀort decisions or which may be independent of it. We consider that the analysis
of the impact of public policy programs on contract design is especially important as
explicit contracts play a prevalent role in venture capital ﬁnance and are quite complex
and sensitive.
We have found that program adequacy depends on the size and speciﬁcation of the
spill-over eﬀect and the experience of the VCs and the Es, as only with highly experienced
contracting parties is signalling possible. If we are confronted with an inexperienced mar-
ket and a spill-over eﬀect which is independent of the eﬀort levels, the public ﬁrst-best
situation can be reached by ex post grants and, under some conditions, by ex ante grants
and investment grants. The eﬀect of guarantee programs depends on the concrete param-
eter constellation. If the spill-over eﬀect depends on the eﬀort levels, only ex post grants
maximize welfare but ex ante and investment grants as well as guarantee programs with a
relatively large spill-over eﬀect continue to be welfare-enhancing if the public institution
can divide the projects at least into the two groups mentioned with respect to their inher-
43ent innovative value. Otherwise, their welfare eﬀect depends on the concrete parameters.
Finally, public support is always welfare-increasing with a dependent spill-over eﬀect.
If we have an experienced market and an independent spill-over eﬀect, we do not
need any public intervention in order to achieve the public ﬁrst-best situation. However,
ex post grants and investment grants (with re-ﬁnancing schemes) without a liquidation
preference by the VC do not destroy the contract mechanisms and so they have only
distributional eﬀects ( this is obviously due to our assumption of lump-sum ﬁnancing).
Guarantee programs, on the contrary, always destroy the truth-revealing mechanism and
ex ante grants and investment grants with a liquidation preference by the VC may do
this under certain conditions too. If we are confronted with a dependent spill-over eﬀect,
only ex post grants and public support are welfare-maximizing. Investment grants (with
re-ﬁnancing schemes) without a liquidation preference have only distributional eﬀects,
but guarantee programs and sometimes ex ante grants and investment grants with a
liquidation preference by the VC continue to destroy the truth-revealing mechanism.
In conclusion, we have observed that guarantee programs, ex ante grants and invest-
ment grants with a liquidation preference are dangerous as they can destroy the contract
mechanisms in the case of experienced markets. Public support is only useful with de-
pendent spill-overs. Ex post grants are quite decidedly the most suitable instrument, as
they guarantee the ﬁrst-best situation regardless of the maturity of the market and the
speciﬁcation of the spill-over eﬀect.
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468 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
The E will oﬀer the contract which yields him the highest proﬁt in t5. Thereby, his proﬁt
depends on the eﬀort levels chosen by both contracting parties as well as the amount
to be paid to the VC. In subsection 3.1, we have shown that the project’s surplus is
maximized when both contracting parties choose private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels. Now we
will show that neither equity nor debt nor debt-equity mixes give both contracting parties
simultaneously an incentive to choose private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in all states of the
project, while preferred stock contracts are able to do so. We assume for simplicity’s sake
that the initial contract cannot be renegotiated at any point in the relationship. In section
III, however, we will derive suﬃcient conditions to guarantee that the deduced convertible
preferred stock contracts are renegotiation-proof. Finally, as a transfer of control rights
cannot convey any additional information, we assume that the E will hold them and thus
will obtain private beneﬁts regardless of the type of contract chosen12.
I. Pure Equity, Pure Debt and Debt-Equity Mixes
1. Pure Equity:
The E oﬀers the VC an equity stake seq ∈ (0,1]. Payoﬀ functions of both contracting
parties for the diﬀerent states are given by
Π
E =( 1 − s
eq)¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
βe
2 + B for θ = good
(1 − s
eq)I −
1
2
βe
2 + B for θ = medium (34)
(1 − s
eq)l(a) −
1
2
βe
2 + B for θ =b a d
12This proof is based on the insights of Schmidt [2003].
47Π
VC = s
eq¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
2 for θ =g o o d
s
eqI −
1
2
γa
2 for θ = medium (35)
s
eql(a) −
1
2
γa
2 for θ =b a d
Both contracting parties will choose their eﬀort levels so as to maximize their payoﬀs.
Eﬀort levels are thus given by the FOCs:
e
eq
g =( 1 − s
eq)
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
<e
∗
g
e
eq
m =0 = e
∗
m
e
eq
b =0 = e
∗
b (36)
a
eq
g = s
eq∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
≤ a
∗
g
a
eq
m =0 = a
∗
m
a
eq
b = s
eq∂l(a)
∂a
≤ a
∗
b
2. Pure Debt:
The E oﬀers the VC a debt claim D>I(due to the the VC’s participation constraint).
Payoﬀ functions of both contracting parties for the diﬀerent states are given by
Π
E =¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
βe
2 + B − max[D, ¯ x(e,a,α)] for θ = good
B −
1
2
βe
2 for θ = medium (37)
B −
1
2
βe
2 for θ =b a d
Π
VC = max[D, ¯ x(e,a,α)] −
1
2
γa
2 for θ = good
I −
1
2
γa
2 for θ = medium (38)
l(a) −
1
2
γa
2 for θ =b a d
48Both contracting parties will choose their eﬀort levels so as to maximize their payoﬀs.
Thus eﬀort levels are again given by the FOCs in bad and medium states.
e
eq
m =0 = e
∗
m
e
eq
b =0 = e
∗
b (39)
a
eq
m =0 = a
∗
m
a
eq
b =
∂l(a)
∂a
= a
∗
b
In the good state, however, we have to distinguish between two cases:
Case 1: D<¯ x(e∗
g,δ,α) − 1
2γe∗
g
2: The VC will choose a marginal eﬀort level in order to
guarantee her claim and the E is full residual claimant and will therefore choose e = e∗
g.
Case 2: D>¯ x(e∗
g,δ,α) − 1
2γe∗
g
2 : If e>0, the VC will choose an eﬀort level of a
g
min ∈ [δ,a∗
g]
which is necessary to guarantee her claim D or at least maximize her payoﬀ. If e =0 ,
due to the imperfect substitutability, the VC will also choose an eﬀort level of 0. The
E anticipates that he will never make positive monetary proﬁts for all e>0 and will
therefore always choose an eﬀort level of 0.
3. Debt-Equity mixes:
Consider any debt-equity contract (Deq,D,s eq,D). Deriving the FOCs analogous to the
cases of pure equity and pure debt ﬁnancing yields at least suboptimal eﬀort levels of
both contracting parties in the good state as the marginal returns on the investments
to the E and the VC are still smaller than one. In the bad state of the project, the VC
invests eﬃciently only if Deq,D >l (a∗
b).
To sum up, we have shown that none of the contracts can implement private ﬁrst-best
eﬀort levels of both contracting parties in all states of the project.
49II. Convertible Preferred Stock Contracts
Consider a convertible preferred stock contract with a limited dividend D and a conversion
option in an equity stake sCV
1 in t4 if the threshold z is reached. Below, we will derive the
optimal design of such a contract. The solution is by backward induction.
The Choice of Eﬀort Levels:
1. Bad State: If D ≥ l(a∗
b), the VC gets the total surplus from the project and so has
an incentive to invest eﬃciently. If l(0) <D<l (a∗
b), the VC will choose the eﬀort level
adev.
b such that the following condition holds: l(adev.
b )=D.I fD ≤ l(0) the VC’s claim is
guaranteed independently of her eﬀort eﬀort level and she will choose a=0. The E knows
that he cannot inﬂuence the outcome and so chooses an eﬀort level of 0.
2. Medium State: The VC and the E know that the project’s surplus is independent of
the eﬀort levels and so both choose an eﬀort level of 0.
3. Good State: The contract includes a conversion option in t4 which is linked to the
threshold z. This threshold indicates the minimum surplus which must be reached for
conversion to be possible. Suppose that the threshold is set at z =¯ x(e,a,α). The solution
is by backward induction. We will derive the conditions which have to apply in order to
guarantee that both contracting parties choose a and e respectively.
a) Choice of eﬀort level by the VC:
Case 1: e = e: The VC anticipates that the threshold z will only be reached if she
exerts an eﬀort level of a ≥ a. After conversion, the VC’s payoﬀ amounts to
Π
VC
g = s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
2 (40)
We know that the VC would maximize her proﬁt by choosing
ˆ a
CV
g = argmax[s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
2] (41)
50If
ˆ a
CV
g <a (42)
holds, the threshold is not reached with ˆ aCV
g and as the VC’s proﬁt is decreasing
in a for a>ˆ aCV
g , the VC will choose a = a whenever conversion pays oﬀ for her13.
This is the case when the VC’s proﬁt with conversion amounts at least to the proﬁt
without conversion which depends on the size of claim D.
1. Assume that D ≤ I. In this case, the VC can guarantee herself the payoﬀ
without exerting any eﬀort. Conversion is only proﬁtable if
IC(VC)
1
conv. : s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
2 ≥ D (43)
2. Assume that D>I , then the VC will choose an eﬀort level of a
g
min ∈ [δ,a∗
g]
which is necessary to guarantee her claim D or at least minimize her loss.
Conversion is proﬁtable if
IC(VC)
2
conv. : s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
2 ≥
min[D,x(e,a
∗
b,α)] −
1
2
γ(a
min
g )
2 (44)
Case 2: 0 <e<e :14 The VC anticipates that the threshold z will only be reached if
she exerts a = amin
conv >a . As the VC’s payoﬀ with conversion is decreasing in a for
a>a(see equation 42), the VC will choose the smallest amin
conv for which conversion
is still possible (i.e. ¯ x(e,amin
conv,α)=z) provided that conversion still pays oﬀ for her.
Without conversion, the VC will have to choose amin
g in order to guarantee her claim
13As ˆ aCV
g <a ∗
g and our aim is to show that private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting parties
can be implemented through an adequately designed conversion option, below, we will restrict ourselves
to this case. But we will have to recheck the limiting assumption in a ﬁnal step.
14For e =0 , conversion is never possible due to the limited substitutability assumption.
51D. In order to ensure that conversion is not proﬁtable for the VC in this case, the
following condition must apply:
s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
min
conv
2 ≤ D −
1
2
γ(a
min
g )
2 (45)
Moreover, we know that if the VC cannot guarantee her claim D by choosing a∗
g,
she will not further increase her eﬀort level as her net payoﬀ would decrease. In this
case, the following condition must hold in order to guarantee that conversion does
not pay oﬀ for the VC:
s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
min
conv
2 ≤ x(ˆ e,a
∗
g,α) −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 (46)
But as x(ˆ e,a∗
g,α) − 1
2γa∗
g
2 >D− 1
2γ(amin
g )2 with amin
g >a ∗
b, condition 46 is auto-
matically fulﬁlled if condition 45 applies. Furthermore, if
1
2
βe
2 −
B
pq
≥ ¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
γa
2 − ¯ x(e,δ,α) (47)
the VC needs only to choose a marginal eﬀort level to guarantee her claim D (for all
privately proﬁtable projects) provided that the E chooses his eﬀort level e. Conse-
quently, due to the concavity of x in a, a deviation of the E is always more costly for
the VC with respect to eﬀort costs when converting than without converting. Thus
45 is always fulﬁlled if sCV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α) − 1
2γa2 ≤ D. We will refer to this condition
as the E’s non-deviation condition. If our assumption did not hold, a convertible
security which implements e and a could only be implemented for more innovative
projects for which D is guaranteed with a = δ only. Less innovative projects may
be partially ﬁnanced anyhow – the security depending on the parameters – but as
private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting parties could never be achieved,
the range of privately proﬁtable projects would be reduced.
Case 3: e>e : In order to be able to exert her conversion option, the VC must invest
52only ˆ a <awith ¯ x(e,ˆ a,α)=z. The incentive constraints of case 1 which guarantee
conversion to be proﬁtable change accordingly.
b) Choice of eﬀort level by the E:
Given the conditions derived in item a), conversion is only implementable for e ≥ e.
As the E anticipates that his proﬁt after conversion continues to be (1−sCV
1 )z even
if he exerts an eﬀort level of e>e , he will choose e = e whenever conversion is
worthwhile for him. This is the case if the following condition applies:
IC(E)
i
conv. :( 1 − s
CV
1 )¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
βe
2 + B ≥ Π(E)
i
dev (48)
with Πi
dev depending on the size of the claim D:
Case 1: If D ≤ I, the E anticipates that the VC will choose an eﬀort level of 0 and
because of the limited substitutability, he will also choose an eﬀort level of 0. Then,
in case of deviation, the payoﬀ in the good state amounts to Π(E)1
dev = I −D +B.
Case 2: If I<D<¯ x(e − δ,δ,α) − 1
2β(e − δ)2, the E anticipates that he will be
full residual claimant and will choose an eﬀort level of e − δ. Then, the proﬁt with
deviation amounts to:
Π(E)2
dev =¯ x(e − δ,δ,α) − 1
2β(e − δ)2 − D + B
Case 3: If D>¯ x(e − δ,δ,α) − 1
2β(e − δ)2, the E will never make positive proﬁts
regardless of his eﬀort level and will choose an eﬀort level of 0. In this case Π(E)3
dev =
B.
2. The Contract Design:
In a ﬁrst step, we will restrict ourselves to contracts for which the PC(VC) is binding.
If such a contract exists which induces private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels of both contracting
parties, we know that no alternative contract exists which increases the E’s proﬁt15.
15If such a contract does not exist, we will have to look also at convertible preferred stock contracts for
53We know from the analysis of the choice of eﬀort levels that in order to guarantee an
eﬃcient eﬀort choice of the VC in the bad state of the project D ≥ l(a∗
b).T h eEh a sa n
incentive to minimize the loss in the bad state because this reduces the amount to be paid
to the VC in the good state and thus maximizes his proﬁt. Thus we want this condition
to hold. Then, the PC(VC) is given by:
(1−p)(1−q)[l(a
∗
b)−
1
2
γa
∗
b
2]+[(1−p)q+(1−q)p]min[I,D]+pq[s
CV
1 ¯ x(e,a,α)−
1
2
γa
2] ≥ I
(49)
If the PC(VC) is binding, we arrive at the following conversion stake sCV
1 :
s
CV
1 =
C + 1
2γa2
¯ x(e,a,α)
with C = I +
(1 − p)(1 − q)
pq
[I − L(a
∗
b)] +
(1 − p)q +( 1− q)p
pq
[I − min[I,D]] (50)
Moreover, we know that the incentive constraints mentioned, which guarantee that con-
version is proﬁtable for both contracting parties, must hold. As (44) is automatically
fulﬁlled when (43) holds, we will only take into account the latter in order to avoid case
diﬀerentiation below. As far as the E is concerned, if (48) holds for i =2 ,t h e ni ti s
automatically fulﬁlled for i =1 ,3 and thus again, we can restrict ourselves to the case of
i =2 . This means that the deduced contracts may not be the only possible equilibrium
contracts. But as our aim is to analyze public intervention on contract design and our
results do not change, we will use this procedure for the sake of simplicity. Including sCV
1
in the E’s maximization problem and anticipating that the limited liability constraint
of the E is always binding in the bad state (as shown, the E will choose D ≥ l(a∗
b) in
order to minimize the loss) and may be binding in the medium state yields the following
which the PC(VC) is not binding. In this case, however, the convertible preferred stock contract needs
not to be the proﬁt-maximizing contract.
54maximization problem:
max
e,a
Π
E
CV = pq[¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
βe
2 −
1
2
γa
2 − C] + [(1 − p)q +( 1− q)p][I − min[I,D]] + B
s.t.
LLC(E)g
PC(E): Π
E
CV ≥ 0
IC(VC)conv. : C ≥ D
IC(E)no−dev. : C ≤ D
IC(E)conv. :¯ x(e,a,α) −
1
2
βe
2 −
1
2
γa
2 − C ≥ ¯ x(e − δ,δ,α) −
1
2
β(e − δ)
2 − D
As far as optimal eﬀort levels are concerned, no further restrictions need to be considered
and the FOCs yield the following optimal eﬀort levels:
e
∗ =
1
β
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂e
= e
∗
g (51)
a
∗ =
1
γ
∂¯ x(e,a,α)
∂a
= a
∗
g (52)
This implies that the E introduces the threshold z =¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) in order to induce both
parties to choose private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels. In addition, our limiting assumption (42)
is also conﬁrmed as indeed is ˆ aCV
g <a ∗
g.
With regard to the conditions, we know that for private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels, equation
47 is fulﬁlled and that the IC(E)no−dev. demands D ≥ C. In addition, the IC(VC)conv.
and the IC(E)conv. must also be fulﬁlled. It is obvious that all conditions hold for D = C.
Thus C = D = I +
(1−p)(1−q)
pq [I − L(a∗
b)].
The E’s proﬁt is thus maximized with this contract and amounts to:
Π
E
CV = pq[¯ x(e
∗
g,a
∗
g,α) −
1
2
βe
∗
g
2 −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 − C]+B (53)
As B ≤ pq 1
2βe∗
g
2,t h eLLC(E)g is automatically satisﬁed when PC(E) holds. And the
PC(E) is fulﬁlled for all privately proﬁtable projects.
55III. A Note on the Renegotiation Issue
Schmidt [2003] shows that if renegotiation is possible, the bargaining power of the E
and/or the beneﬁt from renegotiation must be suﬃciently small to ensure that the con-
vertible security does implement the ﬁrst-best situation. Below, we will look at the impact
of possible renegotiation within our modiﬁed framework. We know that the E has an in-
centive to choose his private ﬁrst-best eﬀort level in the good state only because of the
sequential decision structure, which implies a threat by the VC not to convert and not to
exert eﬀort if e<e ∗
g. In this case, however, scope for renegotiation exists in t =2 ,5:t h e
E could adapt the threshold z and the equity stake sCV
1 in order to make it proﬁtable for
the VC to convert and to exert her private ﬁrst-best eﬀort level even though the E has
chosen e<e ∗
g. Let us assume that renegotiation takes place whenever there is scope for
an eﬃciency improvement and that the E and the VC split the surplus from renegotiation
proportionately (λ,1 − λ,) where λ ∈ [0,1] is the fraction that goes to the E.
If the deviation of the E is relatively small and the VC can still guarantee her claim
D without exerting any eﬀort (or only the marginal eﬀort level δ), it is obvious that, in
our case with D=C, renegotiation never pays oﬀ for the E. While with conversion, he has
to pay C + 1
2γa∗
g
2 to the VC, with deviation and renegotiation, he has to pay at least
D + 1
2γa∗
g
2 and the total surplus of the project is smaller.
However, if the deviation of the E is relatively large, the VC will have to choose a
higher eﬀort level a ∈ (0,a ∗
g] in order to guarantee her claim D. If her claim is never
guaranteed, she will choose a∗
g in order minimize her loss - in this case renegotiation is
never possible, however. Therefore, with a relatively large deviation, the E’s proﬁt after
renegotiation amounts to
Π
E
R = −
1
2
βe
2
dev. + λ[¯ x(edev.,a
∗
g,α) −
1
2
γa
∗
g
2 − D +
1
2
γa
g
min
2]+B (54)
56with D =¯ x(edev.,a
g
min,α). The last large expression is the smaller, the smaller the eﬀort
level chosen by the E. But at the same time, the eﬀort costs of the E are smaller, too. The
E will choose the eﬀort level which maximizes his payoﬀ after renegotiation and which
amounts to
ˆ e
R =
λ
β
[
∂x(edev.,a
g
min,α)
∂a
g
min
+ γa
g
min
∂a
g
min
∂e
] (55)
if ˆ eR ∈ (0,e ∗
g) and otherwise to 0 or e∗
g − δ respectively. Thus to implement renegotiation
proofness for our case with D = C =¯ x(eR,a
g
min,α), the E’s bargaining power must be
suﬃciently small, i.e.
λ ≤
¯ x(e∗
g,a ∗
g,α) − 1
2βe∗
g
2 − 1
2γa∗
g
2 − C + 1
2βeR2
¯ x(eR,a ∗
g,α) − 1
2γa∗
g
2 − D + 1
2γa
g
min
2]
(56)
We assume this to hold in what follows. Then our derived contract with D = C is
renegotiation-proof. Furthermore, we assume that the convertible security contracts con-
tinue to be renegotiation-proof in equilibrium with public intervention. This is always the
case with guarantee programs and given our assumption also with ex ante grants and
investment grants with re-ﬁnancing. With public support, ex post grants and investment
grants with co-ﬁnancing, however, additional constraints must also be fulﬁlled16 which we
assume to hold in the following.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 7:
The E will oﬀer the contracts which yield him the highest proﬁt in t5. Thereby, his proﬁt
depends on three factors: the achievement of truth-revealing by the contracting parties,
the eﬀort levels chosen by the contracting parties and the amount paid to the VC. In
16i.e. λ ≤
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∗SP
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∗SP
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2 for public support and ex post grants, and
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γ
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∂a for invest-
ment grants with co-ﬁnancing, provided that eﬀort cost compensation after renegotiation goes only to
the VC.
57proof 1, we showed that only convertible preferred stock contracts are able to induce both
contracting parties to choose private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in the good state. We will now
anticipate this result and therefore restrict to convertible preferred stock contracts in the
good state. But we know that in order to induce private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels, it is still
crucial to achieve truth-revealing17. Thus in what follows, we will show that there exist
contract sets of preferred stock contracts for which truth-revealing is achieved. Note that
for the sake of simpliﬁcation, renegotiation is excluded at any point of the relationship in
our basic analysis, but its inﬂuence is studied separately afterwards18.
We will ﬁrst look at the case where the E receives the good signal ¯ λ. This means that
the project can either be in the good or medium state. As the E aims to induce truth-
revealing by the VC, he has to design two diﬀerent contracts which ensure that the VC will
choose the good state contract only if she receives the good signal and the medium state
contract only if she receives the bad signal. Analogous to proof 1, we again assume that
the E will oﬀer a convertible security as good state contract which can only be converted if
the threshold z =¯ x(e,a,α) is reached. As far as the medium-state contract is concerned,
we know that eﬀort levels do not have any inﬂuence on the outcome in this case and the
security choice is therefore irrelevant. In the interest of simplicity, we assume that the E
will choose the simplest contract, viz. a contract which implies a ﬁxed payment Dm.T h u s ,
by additionally including the constraints which must be fulﬁlled to ensure truth-revealing
by the VC (SSCs), we can state the following modiﬁed maximization problem of the E:
17If truth-revealing is not achieved, the contracting parties do not know the true state of the project
when choosing their eﬀort levels. But even if the true state of the project was common knowledge before
choosing the eﬀort levels, the E would have an incentive to induce truth-revealing in order to get all
medium state projects ﬁnanced.
18This proof is based on the insights of Houben [2002].
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Analogous to proof 1, we again restrict our analysis to contracts for which the PC(VC)
is binding. A binding PC(VC) requires Dm = I and sCV
2 =
I+ 1
2γa2
¯ x(e,a,α). Given these results,
the SSC(VC)g, the LLC(E)s as well as the PC(E) are always fulﬁlled; the SSC(VC)m,
the IC(VC)conv require that Dg ≤ I; and, at the same time, the IC(E)conv demands
that Dg > max[0,D g(min)] with Dg(min)=I − [¯ x(e,a,α) − 1
2βe2 − 1
2a2 − I] and the
IC(E)no−dev requires that Dg ≥ I19. We can see that all conditions are simultaneously
fulﬁlled for Dg = I. Thus, truth-revealing is achieved and analogous to proof 1 private
ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels are implemented.
We will now look at the case where the E receives the bad signal λ. This means that
19In addition, condition 47 is always fulﬁlled.
59the project can be either in the medium or the bad state. As shown, in the medium state,
the security choice is irrelevant and therefore, we assume again that the E oﬀers a simple
ﬁxed payment contract for which the PC(VC)m is binding: Dm = I. If the VC receives
η, she will not accept the oﬀer as her PC is not fulﬁlled, whereas if she receives ¯ η,h e r
participation constraint is fulﬁlled and she will accept the oﬀer. Her private information
is revealed truthfully.
In a last step, it is important to check that the E does not have an incentive to deviate,
i.e. to oﬀer the contract set related to the good signal if he receives the bad signal and
vice-versa. We know that it is eﬃcient to give the E the control rights in at least one
period. Therefore, we assume that with truthful revelation the E receives private beneﬁts
in both medium and good states. It is easy to see that the E does not have an incentive
to understate because medium state projects would not get ﬁnanced and he would lose
his private beneﬁts. The overstatement case is represented in the following table:
state with truthful revelation with overstatement
medium B (B)
bad 0 (B)
As can be seen in the table, whether overstatement pays oﬀ for the E or not, crucially
depends on the control allocation. Convertible preferred stock contracts aﬀord us the
possibility of a contingent control allocation: control rights can be given to the VC with
the preferred stock contract, but the E can get them back with conversion which is only
possible if the strike z is reached. This can, in turn, only be achieved for good state
projects. A similar mechanism is also implementable for preferred stock contracts with a
limited dividend which may transfer the control rights to the VC. Here, the E can get
back control rights by redeeming the preferred stock contract at a redemption price which
must compensate the VC for his forgone limited dividend Dm (thus Pm = I). However,
60as the E is wealth-constrained, he will be able to redeem the preferred stock at a price
Pm = I only if the project is at least in the medium state. We see from the table that the
E must never hold control rights in both states with overstatement. Thus control rights
have to be transferred to the VC in at least one state giving the E the option to get
them back with truthful revelation. If the E transfers the control rights in the good state
but not in the medium state, truth-revealing can only be achieved for q>0,5.I ft h eE
transfers control rights in the medium state but not in the good state, truth-revealing by
the E is always guaranteed.
As far as renegotiation is concerned, Houben (2002) shows that the contracts must be
slightly modiﬁed in the good and medium states in order to make them renegotiation-
proof. There are two possible cases for proﬁtable renegotiation. First, renegotiation is
proﬁtable if the VC prevents a control transfer back to the E by adopting a certain
behavior. Second, renegotiation is proﬁtable if the E deviates in the good state by choosing
a lower eﬀort level analogous to proof 1. As regards the ﬁrst case, we know that the VC
may be interested in deviating because he expects to get a share (1−λ) of the renegotiation
surplus. One necessary condition for renegotiation is that the E holds suﬃcient cash ﬂow
to compensate the VC. In our framework, this is only given in the good state. Therefore,
the threat by the VC can be circumvented by forgoing the ex ante control transfer in good
state contracts. In this case, as seen above, truthful revelation is always guaranteed.
Second, renegotiation may be proﬁtable for the E analogous to scenario 1. We know
that Dg = I, i.e. the VC’s claim is guaranteed independently of her eﬀort level. In proof 1,
we showed that contracts are then renegotiation-proof for Dg ≥ C = I independently of λ.
Thus to sum up, by choosing Dg = I without control transfer, we obtain a renegotiation-
proof good-state contract which implements private ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels and achieves
truth-revealing.
618.3 The Impact of Ex ante Grants on Contract Design
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